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How Chinese is the South China Sea?
Steve Tensmeyer1

T

he past summer has seen a flare-up in the longstanding feud
between China and the ASEAN nations over the South China
Sea. Since that time, China has used more strident language
in staking its claims, has authorized increased naval drills in the
area, and has warned several countries, including the U.S., not to
“interfere” with what it considers its central security interests.2 The
most remarkable aspect of this most recent phase of the debate, however, is not China’s aggressiveness, but rather its desire to couch its
claims in terms of universal norms. This has made China’s behavior
somewhat more predictable than it has been in previous decades, but
this predictability does not necessarily make China less of a threat
to its neighbors; in fact, it may only give a cooperative veneer to a
fundamentally aggressive foreign policy.
This increased aggressiveness certainly presents a problem for
other countries with claims in the area, but China’s increased commitment to international norms also suggests a way to resolve these
disputes. China has certainly not been shy about what it considers
its sovereign rights, and the cooperation of other states may have
done more harm than good by convincing China that it can act with
impunity. With China becoming a greater threat by the day, the best
choice for the other nations with claims in the South China Sea (all of
which are members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations) may be to seek some legitimation of their claims from an
international body. In this paper, I will investigate one way in which
1
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ASEAN may be able to obtain an international ruling on at least
part of its claims by proposing to the International Seabed Authority
(ISA) a contract for exploration of seabed features and polymetallic
nodules in the open ocean. Since this kind of mining is legally permitted only beyond all international boundaries, when considering
ASEAN’s petition, the ISA may be compelled to determine whether
the area targeted for exploration belongs to China.
China would of course interpret this move as aggressive, and
the political, economic, and perhaps even military blowback would
be significant. A final decision on whether to pursue this line would
have to include a careful evaluation of the possible consequences
in each of these areas. However, in this paper I intend to address
only the legal consequences of such a decision—it may be that, even
if this option would result in a legal victory for ASEAN, political
or economic calculations would make it inadvisable. This essay is
therefore limited in its scope and its conclusions should be interpreted with this limitation in mind.

I. Disputed Areas
The dispute over the South China Sea involves more than just
China’s disagreements with other Southeast Asian countries. There
are many disputes in the region that do not directly involve China.
The Philippines and Vietnam, for example, have had long-standing
disagreements and in 1995 issued a joint statement outlining principles for bilateral relations.3 However, the ASEAN-China dispute
is by far the most important because China claims the entire South
China Sea, contradicting every other country’s claim, and because
ASEAN member states are generally willing to cooperate to
counter China.
One of the major disagreements in the South China Sea area is
over the Paracel Islands, which are claimed by both China and Vietnam. After Vietnam was divided in 1954, the Paracels were administered by South Vietnam. In 1974, when the Vietnamese Civil War
3
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was at its height, China invaded and took over the Paracels. At the
time, because it was China’s ally and because it was involved in a
war with the United States and South Vietnam, North Vietnam did
not strongly object to China’s claim to sovereignty over the islands.4
However, after Vietnam had stabilized, and particularly after relations between the two countries deteriorated to the point of war in
1979, Vietnam began to call for the return of the Paracels and the
renegotiation of maritime borders that had been established by treaties with France before Vietnam won its independence. China has
consistently refused to consider returning the Paracels to Vietnam
(or giving them to the ROC, which also claims them), and as recently
as July of 2010, Communist Party officials asserted that “China will
never waive its right to protect its core interest [including the Paracels] with military means.”5 China has backed up these statements
with the construction of new military infrastructure in the archipelago, including a new airstrip on Woody Island, one of the larger
islands in the group.6
Another disputed chain of islands, the Spratly Islands, has been
claimed by China since the end of World War II, when the ROC
government took control from the defeated Japanese and established
a small military outpost on the largest island. After relocating to Taiwan, the ROC has maintained control of the largest island to this day,
though it does not control the entire archipelago. The Spratly Islands
consist of mostly small, rocky, and uninhabitable outcrops controlled
by small military contingents from China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines. The Spratly and Paracel groups are the most
hotly contested islands, but there are other, smaller islands, reefs,
and atolls whose statuses are still unsettled. The Pratas Islands, for
example, are claimed by the PRC and the ROC, and both the Macclesfield Bank and the Scarborough Shoal are claimed by the PRC,
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the ROC, and the Philippines.7 There are also maritime disputes that
do not deal with islands, but most of these stem from varying interpretations of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea, which will
be dealt with in detail in the next section.
Military clashes over the islands are currently uncommon and
unlikely, though not unprecedented (China’s 1974 invasion of the
Paracels, for example, demonstrates its willingness to back up its
rhetoric with action). However, displays of military strength, almost
exclusively by China, have become commonplace. Among the most
recent was Jiaolong 2010, a round of naval exercises featuring 1,800
soldiers and over 100 ships firing live ammunition.8 Beyond these
displays of power, China has also found other ways to assert its
rights to the area and to showcase its technical superiority; in 2010,
for example, the Chinese Navy used a manned submarine to plant a
PRC flag at the bottom of the South China Sea.9 While there is no
legal significance to such an act, it is symbolically very important.

II. Framework for a Settlement
Several documents have laid the groundwork for future progress
in resolving the South China Sea dispute, and each will need to be
taken into account in any eventual settlement. The most important
of these are the UN Charter, joint statements between the PRC and
other countries regarding the area, the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN,
and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. I will consider each

7
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of these in turn and determine both the process and terms of settlement to which they obligate signatory nations.
The UN Charter forms the foundation of modern international
relations, and there are several provisions that relate to the South
China Sea dispute. The most obvious is Chapter I, Article 2, which
states that “all members shall settle their international disputes by
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity . . . of any state.”10 Of course, such a provision puts limits on China’s actions. It cannot simply stage a military takeover of the South China Sea without significant blows to
its legitimacy and status in the world. Because of China’s desire to
be seen as a responsible player on the world stage, it is unlikely to
take any action that is not amenable to the rhetoric of international
justice and security. But the requirement to protect peace, security,
and justice gives significant latitude. Most countries have interpreted
this provision quite liberally, and China is no exception. In fact, as
we have seen, China explicitly maintains its right to defend its core
interests with force.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which will be considered in detail in the next section) and the UN Charter are both
legally binding treaties, and China and the ASEAN nations must
be careful to follow at least a plausible interpretation of them. The
next documents I will consider, the bilateral PRC-Philippines Joint
Statement of 1995 and the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, do not carry such explicit legal weight. Because both of these
documents (and others that I will not consider here) contain similar
statements, I will analyze both before evaluating their legal status
and the disputant countries’ level of commitment to each of them.
The PRC-Philippines Joint Statement is a declaration of the policy of both parties. In it, both China and the Philippines express their
intent to settle disputes “in a peaceful and friendly manner through
consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect,” to not use
force or the threat of force, to increase cooperation, and to “settle
10
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their bilateral disputes in accordance with the recognized principles
of international law, including UNCLOS.”11 The Declaration on the
Conduct of Parties employs similar language, though this document
applies to all members of ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,
and Vietnam) and China. Like the Joint Statement, the Declaration
calls for equality, respect, renunciation of force or the threat of force,
increased cooperation, and using international institutions and rules,
including UNCLOS, to resolve disputes.12 However, the Declaration
also states the parties’ intention to work for conservation of wildlife,
the reduction of piracy, the development of international regimes, and
other issues of mutual concern even in the absence of a final resolution.13
The Joint Statements and 2002 Declaration have fewer legal provisions to explore, and instead mostly contain positive rhetoric and
expressions of goodwill. Although most of the provisions are unambiguous, their legal status is not. Kittichaisaree, for example, argues
that these declarations and statements have something akin to the
force of law based on a precedent set by the International Court of
Justice in cases involving nuclear testing.14 In making declarations,
the court found that “when it is the intention of the state making the
declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that
intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking, the State thenceforth being legally required to follow a course of
conduct consistent with the declaration.”15 This is a mostly convincing argument: each provision in the 2002 Declaration, for example,
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is prefaced with phrases such as “the parties are committed to” and
“the parties undertake to.”16
Despite this precedent, however, these statements cannot be
considered legally binding in the same way that the aforementioned
treaties are. Most of the language in these statements is ambiguous
and rhetorical, and to the degree that the parties commit themselves
anything, it is to mutual goals rather than particular courses of action.
It is much easier to argue that any given course of action is consistent
with vague goals of cooperation and respect than it is to argue that it
is consistent with legally phrased restrictions on behavior.
Whatever their status, however, these agreements and joint statements offer a window into the priorities of China and the ASEAN
nations. All parties are clearly worried about tensions spiraling out
of control, and the ASEAN countries are understandably wary of
provoking China. Militarily, China has the strength (assuming the
U.S. does not intervene) to take over the entire South China Sea; economically, China also has weapons to deploy against Southeast Asia.
If there were a war in the area, ASEAN would not only lose territory
and prestige, but its economic livelihood would also be threatened.
China, on the other hand, is also hesitant to go to war. The fear of a
rising China, already high in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere, would
reach a fever pitch if it were to flex its muscle by imposing its will
in the South China Sea. And just like ASEAN, China would be hurt
by the loss of trade in the area and beyond, where it would likely be
the subject of international sanctions. Perhaps most importantly, in
the event of war, China would lose much of the rapport that it has
developed in the international community through cooperative participation in international organizations and regimes.
The most important clues that these documents give us, however,
is that they all emphasize working through the UN and other international organizations, particularly through the UN Law of the Sea.
Because all parties have agreed to pursue a settlement that conforms
to the principles and provisions of the Convention, understanding it
is essential to predicting and influencing the future of the dispute.

16
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III. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the
most important document bearing on relations in the South China
Sea: all parties have agreed that any final settlement will be based
on its principles. The first round of this convention was held in 1956,
but for our purposes, the most important document is UNCLOS III,
which was adopted in 1982 and went into effect in 1994.17 Many of
its provisions were merely codifications of common practices, but
there were some innovations, and many issues that previously had
been matters of tradition and convention were given the force of
law. Most importantly, UNCLOS III defines territorial waters and
rights to waterways, which neither of the previous rounds of treaties
had done. States were given different rights in six different areas:
internal waters, territorial waters, archipelagic waters, contiguous
waters, exclusive economic zones, and continental shelves.18 In internal waters, such as rivers and lakes, states have full sovereignty, and
no other states have rights of passage. In territorial waters, which
extend 12 nautical miles from every shore, states have sovereignty,
but all other states have the right of “innocent passage”; that is, any
state can sail non-military ships (except in specific straits deemed
necessary for military transport, in which case military presence
is permitted), but these ships may not stop or engage in commercial activities without permission.19 Rights in archipelagic waters
are especially important in the South China Sea. Archipelagic
waters are basically the waters bounded by the outermost islands in
an archipelago. Archipelagic waters are treated similarly to internal waters, but other states still have the right of innocent passage
through them. The difference between archipelagic and territorial
waters is that two islands may be over 24 nautical miles apart, but if
17
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they are considered to be in one archipelago, the state will still have
territorial rights between them.20 The contiguous zone extends 12
nautical miles beyond territorial waters, and in these areas, states
can enforce their own laws regarding pollution, taxation, customs,
and immigration.21 In a state’s exclusive economic zone, which
extends 200 nautical miles from the shore, states have full economic
rights, including fishing, mineral, and other resource rights. Finally,
a state has exclusive mineral rights on the entire continental shelf
(with some exceptions) extending from its shores, though fishing
and other activities are not regulated. Most importantly, all of these
rights, including those associated with archipelagic waters, apply to
all and only habitable pieces of land.22
These provisions clearly put a premium on occupying islands
and making them habitable. This is one of the primary reasons that
small military contingents from Taiwan, the PRC, the Philippines,
and other countries are stationed on rocks that would naturally be
underwater at high tide; having a qualifying piece of land extends a
state’s economic and political rights that much farther into the open
ocean. Unfortunately, UNCLOS does not give clear rules applying
to situations in which these zones overlap. In the South China Sea,
the problem of overlapping zones has been addressed only in the
Malacca Strait, which has been designated a strategically important
area in which all states have a right to military transport.
There are three primary reasons that China is likely to abide by
and work within the framework of these provisions of UNCLOS.
First, China has signed and ratified the treaty (as have all other countries with claims in the South China Sea. The U.S., another important
actor in the region, has signed the treaty but not ratified it), and it has
a good track record of keeping such treaties. Second, several other
statements and agreements, such as the 2002 Code of Conduct and
China’s joint statement with the Philippines in 1995, have mentioned
the importance of working within the framework of UNCLOS to
20
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resolve differences.23 Third, the Chinese government’s public rhetoric and actions emphasize that it considers the treaty advantageous
for China. The provisions give China the right to military transport
through the Malacca Strait and through any waters in the South
China Sea except those that are within a non-overlapping portion of
another country’s territorial waters. It has used these rights to protect
its security interests in the Indian Ocean, to patrol the South China
Sea, and to occasionally stage naval exercises in the area. Because
of the advantages the Law of the Sea affords Beijing and its desire
to seem supportive of international organizations, China can be
expected to respect and support these rights as a necessary price to
pay for the advantages it believes that UNCLOS provides.
Though all parties have expressed their commitment to resolve
disputes under the framework of UNCLOS, the formal dispute resolution channels under the Convention have not been used. UNCLOS
III establishes three mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of maritime disputes: the UN Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice, and ad hoc dispute resolution tribunals. All
of these mechanisms, however, are venues of optional jurisdiction,
meaning that they can only be used if both parties agree to be bound
by their decisions. Unsurprisingly, China has steadfastly refused to
be bound by the decisions of any of these chambers. This refusal
makes its frequent avowals to resolve the South China Sea dispute
within the framework of the Law of the Sea somewhat hollow and
raises questions about its sincerity. By committing all parties to
resolve the dispute through UNCLOS but then refusing to submit the
dispute to any UNCLOS-approved channels, China is simply perpetuating the status quo, a course that is decidedly in Beijing’s favor.
In the following sections, however, I will show how ASEAN
may be able to break this stalemate. Though it may be regarded by
some as legal trickery, there is a mechanism under UNCLOS that
may allow these countries to force the International Seabed Authority, a chamber created by the Law of the Sea, to make a binding
decision about international boundaries in the South China Sea even

23
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if China does not agree to appear before the chamber or be bound by
its decisions.

IV. The International Seabed Authority
Part XI Section 4 of UNCLOS III established the International
Seabed Authority, which began operations in 1994. The Authority
is headquartered in Jamaica and has established branches in several
countries across the world. It is governed by an Assembly, in which
all 159 signatories to the
Law of the Sea are represented, and a Council, composed of 36 countries with
particular interests in seabed exploration. Contract
applications for open ocean
mining are evaluated and
approved by the Council,
which turns them over to
the ISA’s Legal and TechFigure 1. South China Sea claims
nical Commission upon
receipt and bases its decision primarily on the Commission’s recommendation.24 The Commission itself is composed of 25 experts in
law and the science of deep-sea mining elected by the Council. These
members come from many different countries but are meant to act
in their capacity as experts and not as representatives of their states.
The Commission also recommends regulations and rules regarding
the exploitation of certain types of mineral deposits. To date, it has
ratified rules for only three types of mineral deposits: polymetallic
nodules, polymetallic sulfides, and ferromanganese crusts.25
The ISA’s mandate is to “organize and control activities in the
Area, particularly with a view to administering the resources of the

24
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25

Id.

BYU Prelaw Review, Vol. 26, 2012

80

Area.”26 The Area is defined as the seabed and waters outside the
jurisdiction of any nation: that is, any area beyond the furthest extent
of any state’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Significantly, the convention itself does not establish the status of disputed areas. Perhaps
this is because they did not anticipate a circumstance in which one
country would dispute another’s claim not with its own counterclaim
but with an argument that the area in question is in fact beyond any
national jurisdiction. However, this is precisely the dispute in the
South China Sea. All ASEAN countries have expressed some willingness to agree to a plan whereby UNCLOS provisions would be
applied as though all islands and waters in the South China Sea were
considered res nullius, or newly discovered islands, and if such a
policy were formally adopted by ASEAN, there would still be an
area that belonged to no state (fig. 1).27 The existence of this “no
man’s land” will be crucial to my argument for ASEAN’s options
under the Law of the Sea.
The International Seabed Authority’s mandate is quite vague,
and there is no consensus on the precise limits of its activities. Some
scholars argue that its authority is strictly limited by article 82.4,
which states that the authority shall arrange for an equitable distribution to all nations of resources taken from the Area.28 Others take
a more expansive view. Whatever the theoretical powers of the ISA
are, however, in practice the ISA has interpreted its responsibility to
organize activities in the Area very broadly. All development and
exploration of resources in the Area seabed, for example, must first
be approved by and contracted with the Authority. Contract applications are submitted to the Legal and Technical Commission, which
evaluates whether the proposed work conforms to the regulations

26
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governing exploration or mining of the relevant mineral.29 If the
contract conforms to these regulations, the Commission accepts the
application, and the Council then approves the contract.
To date, the Authority has approved nine contracts. Most are
in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone south of Hawaii, which contains
the world’s richest polymetallic sulfide deposits and most abundant polymetallic nodules.30 The only other other area that has been
opened for exploration and development is in the Indian Ocean just
to the southeast of the Maldives. The contract for this area, which
was concluded with the China Ocean Mineral Resources Research
and Development Association in May 2001, has been widely controversial, because many observers, particularly India, have interpreted
it as part of China’s effort to extend its reach to south Asia and blunt
India’s influence. The Authority’s relevance to the South China Sea
is particularly striking considering that in this case, China used mineral exploration contracting as a geopolitical tool.

V. ASEAN and the International Seabed Authority
If all members of ASEAN with claims in the South China Sea
can agree to a framework that includes the application of boundaries
based on the Law of the Sea (as shown by the dotted lines in figure
1) a contract with the International Seabed Authority may offer a
unique opportunity for them to legitimate their claims. If ASEAN
applies for an exploratory contract in the area claimed by China but
not by any other Southeast Asian nation, when considering the contract, the ISA (or more particularly, the Legal and Technical Commission) may be forced to decide whether the piece of seabed in
question is indeed part of the Area, that is, whether it falls within
any nation’s jurisdiction. To decide that it is in the Area would not
only invalidate China’s claim to that particular part of the ocean,
it would also legitimate ASEAN’s broader claims to a delineation
29

See Decision of the Assembly of the International Seabed Authority Relating to the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration for Polymetallic
Nodules in the Area, ISBA/6/A/18 (July 20, 2000), at 15.
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of boundaries based strictly on exclusive economic zones evaluated
from each country’s coasts.
For such a result to be possible, however, ASEAN would have
to do considerable preparation beforehand. Any contract application
that it submitted would have to conform to the Authority’s regulations in every detail. This would be particularly important because
it is unlikely that a functionalist institution like the ISA would relish being asked to step into the middle of one of the most important
boundary disputes in the world. If the application could be rejected
on a technicality, therefore, it is likely that the Commission would
reject it on that basis to avoid having to decide the limits of
national jurisdiction.
If the application were sufficiently foolproof, however, the regulations and procedures of the Authority suggest that the Commission
would either have to decide on its own the limits of China’s EEZ
or refer the matter to the Law of the Sea Tribunal for a decision.
The regulations for the exploration of polymetallic nodules state that
after an application is received, the secretary general first reviews
the application.31 If the secretary general determines that it conforms
to the Convention and the regulations, he or she will give notification and send it on to the Legal and Technical Commission. The
Commission then confirms that proper assurances have been made,
that the project will not pose a significant danger to marine life, and
that the project conforms to several other technical specifications.
The regulations state that “if the Commission. . .determines that the
proposed plan of work for exploration meets the requirements. . .
the Commission shall recommend approval of the plan of work for
exploration to the Council.”32 In other words, if the applications do
not violate the Convention or the regulations, then the Commission
shall recommend approval. The Council’s subsequent approval is
largely pro forma.
Considering the geopolitical consequences of having some areas
determined to be outside of national jurisdiction, one might assume
that disputed areas are off-limits for exploration. However, whether
31
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because of simply an
oversight or because of a
conscious decision, neither the Convention in its
definition of the Area nor
the Regulations on Prospecting and Exploration
for Polymetallic Nodules in the Area contain
any mention of disputed
areas. The closest guid- Figure 2. The International Seabed Authority’s
ance here is the state- map of the South China Sea. The black lines
ment that the Area is any represent the limits of any national jurisdiction.
part of the ocean beyond
any states’ jurisdiction. The International Seabed Authority, in its
role as approver of contracts, can reasonably be expected to decide if
certain parts of the seabed fall within the Area, and if ASEAN can
force the ISA to make such a decision, it seems most likely that the
Authority will not side with China, as we will see in the next section.

VI. The Case for ASEAN
There is not enough space here to give a complete analysis of
the case for and against China’s claims to the South China Sea. Such
analyses have also already been given in great detail by experts in
the field on both sides of the issue. In this section, I aim only to give
enough evidence to show that an argument for boundary delimitation based on the law of the sea is prima facie stronger than China’s
argument based on historical records and archaeological discoveries.
First, it seems reasonable to accept the Law of the Sea principles
unless there is compelling evidence or extraordinary circumstances
that necessitate adopting some different rule. In the South China Sea
dispute, China claims that because it has historical maps purporting
to show the South China Sea islands as part of its territory as well as
archaeological evidence that the Chinese had visited the islands as
early as the voyages of Zheng He in the early 15th century, its claims
extend much farther into the South China Sea than they would if
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the EEZ were simply calculated with the islands being considered
res nullius.33 As can be seen in figure 1, China’s claims extend even
to the beaches of Malaysia! If this evidence cannot be conclusively shown to support China’s claim to historical ownership of the
islands, therefore, our preference prima facie should be for treating
the islands as res nullius and drawing the EEZs accordingly.
China’s evidence is not nearly as conclusive as Beijing claims
that it is. As the government of Vietnam has argued, the map that the
Chinese have produced gives no reason to believe that the islands
belong to China.34 In fact, it seems that if they are labeled or demarcated at all, the map indicates that these islands were outside of
China. The archaeological evidence is similarly ambiguous. In the
pre-modern era, Chinese commerce was common throughout East
Asia, and communities of overseas Chinese have existed in Malaysia
and the Philippines for centuries.35 A Chinese artifact, therefore, is
almost as likely to have come from any other nations in the area as
it is to have come from China. Furthermore, even if these artifacts
could be shown to have come from China, they are more likely to
have been dropped by a ship temporarily docking on the island than
to have come from a permanent settlement. In the time period that
the artifacts are dated to, it is unlikely that a community on even
the largest of the islands would be able to survive because of how
isolated it would have been.
Other members of ASEAN, such as Vietnam, which occupied
the Paracels until the Chinese invaded, have equally valid claims
to many of the islands. And many, including the Philippines, have
argued that because of the islands long occupation by the Japanese,
World War II effectively made the area a res nullius.36 Indeed, when
33
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Japan and the United Sates signed the San Francisco treaty, which
ended World War II, the islands of the South China Sea were ordered
to be returned to their rightful owners, but unlike almost every other
square inch of former Japanese territory, no nation was named as
owner of the islands.37 The Philippines has the additional claim that,
as an archipelagic nation, the Spratly islands more naturally belong
to it, seeing that geologically they are arguably part of the same
archipelago.
In addition to this evidence based on international law and precedent that the area should be evaluated based on the Law of the Sea
EEZ lines, there is also good evidence that the International Seabed
Authority does not consider China’s claims totally valid. And since
under the scenario I have outlined the Authority’s opinion is the
essential element in legitimating ASEAN’s claims, this evidence is
extremely important. According to the ISA’s own maps (fig. 2), part
of the South China Sea is outside all national boundaries.38 It would
be very difficult for the Authority to deny ASEAN’s application on
the basis that the area is in dispute or on the basis that it belongs to
China when its own maps show it to be beyond any state’s EEZ.
Even if one does not accept this evidence as conclusive, it still
seems that in the absence of compelling evidence either way, it is
most reasonable to start from a clean slate and simply evaluate the
area based on the Law of the Sea as it is currently written. In other
words, the burden is on China to prove its claims. If it cannot do so
(as is likely), then evaluating boundaries as though the area were
res nullius is the only principled and tenable compromise position.
It therefore is likely that if the International Seabed Authority did
agree to decide whether the piece of seabed in question were part
of the Area, it would decide that at least some portion of the sea is
beyond all international boundaries. This would invalidate China’s
strident claims and pave the way for a settlement that favors ASEAN.
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VII. Conclusion
The dispute in the South China Sea has only become more
intractable since it began, and if decisive steps are not taken, the situation is likely to continue to deteriorate. The discovery of important
oil reserves and the increasing geopolitical importance of the region
have raised the stakes tremendously. Because China is quickly rising as a military and economic force in the region, ASEAN can no
longer afford to simply sit back and hope that the crisis turns out in
its favor.
As I have shown, one option that has striking legal benefits is
pursuing a contract for mineral exploration from the International
Seabed Authority. Though it is certainly an unconventional avenue
for legitimating or arbitrating territorial claims, the provisions of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Authority’s regulations on mineral exploitation are written in such a way that the ISA
may be compelled to decide whether the center of the South China
Sea belongs to China or is the “common heritage of mankind” and
falls beyond any national jurisdiction.39 China has refused several
times to have its disputes adjudicated before the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, and this response is unsurprising and
even rational. After all, Beijing knows that its claims are contrary
to commonly accepted international norms and laws and unlikely
to stand up to international legal scrutiny. Because any settlement
must be based on the Law of the Sea, appealing to the International
Seabed Authority may be the only peaceful way for ASEAN to force
China to live up to the international agreements it claims to uphold.

39

Wines, supra note 7.

